The decision that came around 4pm in Washington DC and was quickly disseminated to relevant governments, then made public, has profound implications on one hand, if Russia is to be believed. On the other hand it’s just as likely to have little value and be a too little too late response when there’s not much left to provide in response to what Washington calls an escalation.
When the prospect of long range use inside Russia proper materialised two things happened. Putin changed Russian nuclear doctrine to create an artificially low threshold at which tactical weapons could be used – entirely as a warning to the west not to allow long range weapons use in Russia.
His argument was that Ukraine was incapable of creating the target list and providing the technical target data without the missile originators help. Therefore the missile originator was involved in the war and a legitimate target.
There is a degree of truth to the target information data- but Ukrainians are the ones who decide what to do and when to fire and what at. That’s not an American or British or French decision. Putin suggesting Ukraine can’t work the system is both a deliberate racial slur suggesting they’re too stupid and a convenient way of looking at things. It’s typical of Putin and his ability to frame a situation to suit his needs. His aim was to delay at the least and prevent if possible, the use of these weapons at all. And he succeeded. This is the last of his red lines and it’s finally been crossed after years of dithering.
The big issue now is that most of the warplanes, and likely targets are long ago moved behind the 306km range of the weapons.
Washington is framing the missile use in its usually Bidenesque and tortured way.
It is they say, a response to the NK deployment of troops against Ukraine – a number that’s now said to be increasing over time to 100,000 – not all at once but as a force to support the frontline forces at possibly the 30-40,000 level.
The initial use will be contained to the Kursk area because that’s where the NK forces are deployed. Eventually use will spread.
The problem with this and one of reasons the Americans have refused permission for so long, is that American stocks of older and expiring ATACMS have largely been supplied and used. The replacement weapon is only just in production and US stocks of what it considers a vital weapon for use in the Pacific is at minimum. There’s little left to give.
The other issue is that the S-400 systems are extremely good at shooting down ballistic missiles – it’s happened before in Crimea. So the missiles use really needs to be on tactically relevant targets unlikely to be in range of interception.
In so many ways this is all too little too late.
What of Russia’s response? They’re bound to make a fuss but the reality of it is the missiles use is of negligible significance in the wider picture. When they could have been making a difference they weren’t allowed to be used and Russia moved its aircraft from the bases in range long ago.
StormShadow and SCALP-EG have their own issues.
F-16 can’t lift them they’re far too big for it. The Mirage-5F can carry it but they’re two months away. The couple of remaining Su-24 Fencers left are the only remaining delivery system, and putting them far enough forward to launch with range is always a risk, but with F-16 escorts maybe a more acceptable one. Again their target types are ammo depots, C3 sites and logistics hubs. Hitting those around Kursk would be useful. But let’s not forget that those missiles are dwindling in number. Even if the Taurus was added it’s such a specific weapon for such a specific target (very hard and very deep C3 sites) its value is limited.
Putin managed to deter the use of these missile types for far longer than he should have. Now they’re available their impact as he well knows, will be annoying but not hugely significant.